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questioned. Of course, common law may be perfectly competent
to give remedies in most matters of tort law, but so is the civil
law. Apart from the relevance of article 667 in the field of civil
responsibility in general, one ought to consider its relevance in
cases regarded as matters of "nuisance" in common law juris-
dictions. If the intention of the majority opinion of the supreme
court were to facilitate adoption of the common law of nuisance,
additional questions arise as to the advisability of the court's
action. The law of nuisance is perhaps the least developed branch
of the common law of torts."' Wholesale adoption of the com-






In Succession of Willis v. Martin' some two weeks after the
death of Olan Willis, his daughter Audry, as his sole surviving
heir, sold two lots formerly belonging to the deceased. This suit
was instituted by the vendees to traverse the descriptive list filed
by the administratrix in the succession of Olan, and to remove
therefrom the two lots which were listed by the administratrix
as forming part of the estate of the deceased. Although the court
admitted that the property of the deceased was transmitted to
the heir by operation of law, and that the heir could validly
convey his interest therein, the vendee, the court stated, held
111. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 87 at 592 (3d ed. 1964): "There is perhaps
no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds
the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men, and has been ap-
plied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a
cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of
any exact or comprehensive definition. Few terms have afforded so excellent
an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catch-
word as a substitute for any analysis of a problem; ... there has been a
rather astonishing lack of any full consideration of 'nuisance' on the part
of legal writers. It was not until the publication of the Restatement of
Torts in 1939 that there was any really significant attempt to determine
some definite limits to types of tort liability which are associated with the
name."
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 So.2d 732 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 225 La. 244, 230
So.2d 93 (1970).
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that interest subject to the claims of creditors and, therefore,
the property should remain on the descriptive list pending the
administration of the succession.
The writer has difficulty with this holding. If the heir be-
comes owner of the property of the deceased immediately upon
the death of the latter 2 and if the act of the heir in selling the
succession property constitutes an unconditional acceptance by
the heir which renders him personally liable for all the debts of
the deceased,8 and if, as the court admitted, the heir could validly
convey his interest, nay, his ownership, to the vendee, there
seems to be no valid reason why the purchaser from the heir
should be divested of title, particularly where the heir, by his
unconditional acceptance, has made himself legally and person-
ally responsible to the succession creditors for all debts of the
deceased.
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
Donations Omnium Bonorum or with Reservation of Usufruct
Article 1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code permits the donor
to dispose of the usufruct of the thing given in favor of another,
but he is expressly prohibited from reserving it for himself. This
article was recently applied in Taylor v. Spencer,4 where the
plaintiffs, collateral heirs of the "vendor," sought to declare null
a sale of a twenty-acre tract of land by the deceased eleven years
prior to her death on the grounds that the recited cash considera-
tion of $750 had never been paid and that, therefore, the con-
veyance was simply a donation which was void for the reason
that the "vendor" had expressly reserved the usufruct to herself
in direct contravention of the express prohibition contained in
that article. In affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
the court simply followed what seems to be a well established
jurisprudential rule that in such cases, the transaction is radically
null, and that any party in interest may institute an action to
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1292: "When a person, at his decease, leaves several
heirs, each of them becomes an undivided proprietor of the effects of the
succession, for the part or portion coming to him, which forms among the
heirs a community of property, as long as it remains undivided." See also
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 940 and following.
3. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 989, 992, 1013.
4. 225 So.2d 98 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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annul the transaction since it is not limited to the forced heirs
or creditors of the donor.5
Under the corresponding articles in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1808 and the Code Napolon, the donor was expressly per-
mitted to reserve the usufruct for himself,6 and provision was
made for the imputation of such a donation, when made in favor
of the heirs in the descending line, to the disposable portion of
the donor.7 Although the redactors of the Code of 1825 retained
this latter provision as article 1487 of that Code (which was
carried over into the 1870 Code as article 1500 thereof), they
nevertheless elected to prohibit the donor from retaining the
usufruct for himself because they feared that "[the] reservation
of the usufruct in favor of the donee (sic) [donor] would pro-
duce the disadvantage of concealing from the eyes of the public
the change of property which had taken place. He who wishes
to enjoy during his life a piece of property which he destines for
another, can give it by last will, and it is not easy to perceive
the use of a donation inter vivos, with reserve of usufruct.',
In view of the recordation laws generally, and in particular
the provisions of article 1554 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
requiring the recordation of donations of immovables in order
to affect third persons, the writer suggests that the fears of the
redactors are no longer warranted, and that perhaps article 1533
should be restored to its original version.
In Magee v. Stacy9 plaintiffs sued to set aside a purported
sale of their entire property to the defendants, alleging that the
recited price was not paid, that the sale was in effect a donation
in disguise, and that as such, it was null under the provisions of
5. See Byrd v. Byrd, 230 La. 260, 88 So.2d 214 (1956) and cases cited there-
in; Heintz v. Gilber, 140 So.2d 518 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962), noted in The Work
of the Lousiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1969 Term-Succesions. and
Donations, 23 LA. L. Rsv. 266, 272-74 (1963).
6. La. Digest of 1808, bk. 3, tit. 2, art. 50 at 20: "The donor is permitted
to reserve for his own advantage, or to dispose for the advantage of any
other person, of the usufruct or enjoyment of the immovable property given."
(Emphasis supplied.)
FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 949: "I est permis au donateur de faire la r6serve
& son profit, ou de disposer au profit d'un autre, de la jouissance ou de
l'usufruct des biens meubles ou immeubles donnis."
"The donor Is permitted to reserve for his own advantage, or to dispose
for the advantage of any other person, of the enjoyment or usufruct of the
movable or immovable property given." (Author's translation.)
7. La. Digest of 1808, bk. 3, tit. 2, art. 24 at 214; FSNCH CIV. CODS art.
918.
8. 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARcHrvs, PRoir 209 (1937).
9. 223 So.2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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article 1497 of the Louisiana Civil Code which prohibits a person
from making gratuitous dispositions of his property without re-
serving enough for his subsistence. 10 Finding that no considera-
tion was in fact paid by the defendants and that the transaction
was a donation omnium bonorum, the court properly declared
the same null by application of article 1497.
Unlike the other articles of this title in the Louisiana Civil
Code, the sources of which are easily traceable to the provisions
of the Code Napol6on, article 1497 was evidently taken from
Spanish sources, making its first appearance in the Code of 1825,
as article 1848 of that Code," upon the following recommendation
of the redactors: "We propose to re-establish this wise disposi-
tion which before existed and which the Code [of 1808] had
abolished, wherefore we have not learned."'1
In Lagrange v. Barre,18 decided in 1845, the court, referring
to Febrero and other Spanish commentators, stated that the rea-
sons for the prohibition were, among others, that the donor
would be left without the things necessary for his maintenance,
that he would thus deprive himself of the right to make a testa-
ment, that the occasion could arise that the donee would plot
the death of the donor with the view of taking possession of his
property as soon as possible and that it was against public policy
for the donor to render himself impecunious. The court con-
cluded, therefore, that such a donation was invalid, even though
made subject to the obligation of the donee to support the donor
during his natural life. 14
In view of the positive language of article 1497 (although
seemingly at variance with the provisions of article 1500 of the
Louisiana Civil Code which, at least impliedly, appear to permit
10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1497: "The donation inter vvoa shall in no case
divest the donor of all his property; he must reserve enough for subsistence;
if he does not do it, the donation is null for the whole."
11. The redactors indicated the source to be the Recopilacion de Castille,
bk. 5, tit. 10, law 8. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET 209 (1937). see
also Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845), which appears to be the lead-
ing case on the subject and in which other Spanish source references are
given.
12. 1 LOuISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET 209 (1937).
13. 11 Rob. 302 (La. 1845).
14. Id. at 310. "It is perfectly clear from these authorities, that the
mere obligation on the part of the donee to support the donor is not sufficient
to make a donation omnium bonortm valid, and as they are in accordance
with our laws on this subject, we feel no hesitation in adopting the same
doctrine."
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 227
the donor to make a donation "for an annuity for life")15 the de-
cision in the Stacy case is clearly correct. Several questions,
however, may arise in connection with this article. Aside from
the proposition that the donor himself may bring the action of
nullity, should anyone else be permitted to do so? The supreme
court has held that the action may not be brought by the col-
lateral heirs of the donor even after his death, the right to in-
voke the nullity being personal to, and dying with, the donor.'0
But in Succession of Turgeau7 the court concluded: "We are...
of the opinion that the right of attack after the death of the de
cujus is of a personal character and that only forced heirs can
urge the ground to the extent of their legitime."18 (Emphasis
supplied.)
If this is true, then the action of the forced heirs, instituted
after the death of the deceased (for no action can be instituted
during the life of the donor, unless it is by the donor himself)
is an action for the reduction of an excessive donation, and not
an action of nullity. It would also appear that what the supreme
court said in Bernard v. Noel, that the "nullity declared by ar-
ticle 1497 of the Civil Code is absolute only relatively to the par-
ticular persons in whose special interest it was passed,"' 9 name-
ly, in the interest of the donor himself, is more apt to be correct.
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
Capacity
Succession of McGowan 0 was a suit to declare the testament
of the de cujus null on the ground that at the time it was con-
fected, the testatrix was mentally incompetent due to her habi-
tual and excessive use of alcohol. Although there was testimony
tending to prove that the testatrix used alcohol in excessive
quantities, the court pointed out that "it is acceptable to look
into the testamentary capacity of an individual prior to, at the
time of, and after the execution of a last will and testament to
determine and draw a conclusion as to the condition of the tes-
tator or testatrix at the exact moment that the last will is exe-
15. LA. CIV. CODs art. 1500.
16. Bernard v. Noel, 45 La. Ann. 1135, 13 So. 787 (1893).
17. 130 La. 650, 58 So. 497 (1912).
18. Id. at 655, 58 So. at 499.
19. 45 La. Ann. 1135, 1137, 13 So. 737, 738 (1893).
20. 234 So.2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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cuted," 21 (emphasis supplied) and concluded, as did the trial
judge, that the evidence as a whole was insufficient to declare
the testatrix incapable at the time of confection.
In Rivette v. Moreau22 an appeal was taken from a summary
judgment decreeing the statutory will of the testatrix an abso-
lute nullity on the grounds that she was unable to read at the
time of its execution. In view of the conflicting evidence in the
record on this important issue of fact,23 the appellate court cor-
rectly reversed the lower court, holding that it was error to
grant a motion for summary judgment in such circumstances.
Form-Statutory Will
As has been previously stated, it should not be too difficult
for a competent notary to observe and to comply properly with
the simple and comparatively few requirements for the confec-
tion of a statutory will, particularly in view of the permissiveness
of the statute regarding the attestation clause and the fact that
the statute itself suggests the form to be used.2 Yet, the question
as to whether these simple formalities have been observed con-
tinues to be a source of litigation. Briefly, these formalities are
as follows: the will must be in writing and signed by the tes-
tator on each page in the presence of the notary and the wit-
nesses, after the testator has signified to them that the instru-
ment is indeed his last will and testament; the notary and the
witnesses must sign their names at the end of the dispositive
provisions in the presence of each other; these facts must then
be evidenced in writing in the act of superscription or attesta-
tion clause in the form suggested by the statute, as follows:
"Signed on each page ... and declared by the testator
21. Id. at 467. The legislation and the jurisprudence are to the effect
that capacity to make a will is tested as of the time the will its executed.
LA. Civ. CODS art. 1472; Succession of Heineman, 172 La. 1057, 136 So. 51(1931); Hennessey's Heirs v. Woulfe, 49 La. Ann. 1376, 22 So. 394 (1897);
Kingsbury v. Whitacker, 32 La. Ann. 1055 (1880). In the Hennessey case,
supra, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that on an inquiry into the
testamentary capacity of the testator as affected by drink, the test Is so-
briety at the time of execution. If this is true, it would seem that evidence
of incapacity prior to and after the confection of the testament would be
irrelevant.
22. 225 So.2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
23. Medical testimony to the effect that the testatrix was blind for all
practical purposes and that her eyesight would not Improve, as against depo-
sitions of the notary and other witnesses that the testatrix was able to read
at the time the will was executed.
24. See The 'Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1968
Term-uccessions and Donations, 24 LA. L. Rsv. 184, 186 n. 7 (1964).
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above named, in our presence to be his last will and testa-
ment, and in the presence of the testator and each other we
[the testator, the notary and the two witnesses] have here-
unto subscribed our names on this - day of , 19- ."
In Succession of Reeves25 the attestation clause indicated
that the testator had in fact declared that the instrument was
his last will and since it was subscribed by the testator, the no-
tary, and the witnesses, the court upheld the validity of the will
after concluding that it had actually been executed in accordance
with the statutory formalities.
2
A similar question arose in Succession of Morgan2 where
the attestation clause was simply as follows:
"This will has been signed on each page by the Testatrix
CLARICE VEAL MORGAN, after due reading of the whole,
in our presence, to be her last will and testament, and in the
presence of the testatrix and each other, we the undersigned
Notary Public and witnesses and the Testatrix have here-
unto subscribed our names on this the 14th day of June,
1967, at New Orleans, Louisiana."
The will was declared null on the grounds that the act of su-
perscription did not evidence that the testatrix signified to the
notary and the witnesses that the instrument was her will.
A more serious question was presented in Succession of Gor-
don,2 also involving a statutory will, in which the date in the
attestation was simply "October , 1966." In the opinion
of this writer, the court of appeal correctly held the will invalid
for lack of a date. The statute itself29 leaves no doubt that in
order to be valid, the statutory will must be drawn in substantial
conformity with the form established by the statute, among
which is the requirement that the will show the day, month,
and year, in which it was executed.
25. 224 So.2d 502 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
26. Id. at 504: "In our opinion, the attestation of this will adequately
evidences in writing that the statutory formalities have been complied with.
The attestation by the testator alone includes certification that the statutory
formalities of execution were complied with. This attestation is above the
signatures of the testator, the notary, and the witnesses. This is all that
the statute requires of the attestation."
27. 230 So.2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 255 La. 807, 233
So.2d 247 (1970).
28. 233 So.2d 54 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 235 So.2d 950 (La.
1970).
29. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1952), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 123, § 1.
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It appears, however, that the defendants cited French au-
thority in support of their contention that only an olographic
will need be dated. The reference is to 10 Aubry et Rau, 3 Civil
Law Translations section 671, page 168 (West, 1969), where it is
stated that it is not generally necessary that a mystic will be
dated. But the evident reason for this, as the authors themselves
indicate, is that such a will is incomplete until the act of super-
scription is executed. Such an act must bear a date simply be-
cause it is a notarial act governed by the law of 25 Vent6se An
XI, which is incorporated by reference into the Civil Code of
France. Aubry and Rau say:
"1. The form of testaments consists in the aggregate
of the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of dec-
larations of last will.
"The Civil Code contains all the rules pertaining to the
form of olographic testaments and of acts intended to be
converted into mystic testaments. It also contains quite a
number of provisions relative to the form of testaments by
public act and of acts of superscription of mystic testaments.
But, as these provisions do not constitute a complete system
of legislation on the subject matter, they must be combined
with those of the law of 25 Vent6se An XI, on the redaction
of notarial acts in general, and both must be observed simul-
taneously .... ".80
"On the formalities of public testaments the Civil Code
does not contain a complete system of special legislation.
The purpose of the provisions of the Code in subjecting these
testaments to particular formalities is generally to surround
them with more solemnities than ordinary notarial acts. It
results that the general rules established by the law of 25
Vent6se An XI on the formalities of notarial acts, must be
observed in the public testament, unless the Code derogates
therefrom by provisions distinctly contrary thereto. From
this principle flow, among others, the following consequences:
"Public testaments must, under pain of nullity be dated
and make mention of the place where they are made .... .
(Emphasis supplied.) 81
30. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS § 664 (6th ed. 1954) in LAZARUS,
3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 664 at 127 (1969).
31. Id. § 670 at 155.
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It is true that the only article in the Code Napoleon that
requires a date on a will is article 970, prescribing the formali-
ties for the olographic testament. But in view of the above, the
reason is clear: provision for a date had to be made because the
olographic will was not governed by the laws of Vent~se referred
to above.
It would appear that the failure of the Louisiana Civil Code
to make provision for the date in wills other than the olographic
will is due to the fact that these articles were taken from the
French articles which, as noted, were silent on the subject. But
this inadvertence is not grounds for saying that only the olo-
graphic will need be dated. As the court points out in the in-
stant case, there are very strong reasons why a date is neces-
sary in all wills.
But all this is extraneous to the question presented for ad-
judication in the Gordon case, for there is no mistake or ambiguity
in requiring a complete date for validity thereof in the legisla-




The Round Trip Excursion to Article 667 and Return
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him." Louisiana
Civil Code article 667.
The basic nature of the obligation imposed by Louisiana's
anomalous Civil Code article 667 together with the proper ambit
for the operation of that article has been the subject of lively
debate among law writers for the past twenty-five years.' One
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., the discussions of Professor Joseph Dainow in faculty sym-
posia on the Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court-Torts: 8 LA. L. Rsv. 236
(1948), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 452 (1970);
11 LA. L. Rsv. 179 (1951), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA
TORTS LAW 456 (1970); 26 LA. L. Rev. 466 (1966), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY,
STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAw 456 (1970); 27 LA. L. Rsv. 438 (1967), W.
MALONE) and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 460 (1970). The
present writer has similarly held forth on the article in the same series of
